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Abstract—Recent research has established the possibility of deducing soft-biometric attributes such as age, gender and race from an
individual’s face image with high accuracy. However, this raises privacy concerns, especially when face images collected for biometric
recognition purposes are used for attribute analysis without the person’s consent. To address this problem, we develop a technique for
imparting soft biometric privacy to face images via an image perturbation methodology. The image perturbation is undertaken using a
GAN-based Semi-Adversarial Network (SAN) - referred to as PrivacyNet - that modifies an input face image such that it can be used by
a face matcher for matching purposes but cannot be reliably used by an attribute classifier. Further, PrivacyNet allows a person to
choose specific attributes that have to be obfuscated in the input face images (e.g., age and race), while allowing for other types of
attributes to be extracted (e.g., gender). Extensive experiments using multiple face matchers, multiple age/gender/race classifiers, and
multiple face datasets demonstrate the generalizability of the proposed multi-attribute privacy enhancing method across multiple face
and attribute classifiers.
Index Terms—semi-adversarial, neural networks, autoencoder, face image, perturbation, soft biometrics, deep learning.
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1 INTRODUCTION
FAce recognition has been widely used in several applica-tions, including access control in smartphones, surveil-
lance for public safety, and finding missing children [1], [2],
[3], [4], [5], [6], [7].
The primary purpose of collecting and storing face im-
ages in a biometric system is the recognition of individuals.
Yet, face images stored in a database implicitly contain aux-
iliary information about each individual in the database [8].
These auxiliary information are commonly referred to as
soft biometric attributes, which include gender, age, ethnicity,
race, body mass index, and health characteristics [9].
Soft biometric attributes can facilitate a large variety of
applications [8], such as improving face recognition perfor-
mance [10], clustering users, and developing targeted adver-
tisements [11]. Recent advances in machine learning have
made it possible to extract such soft biometric attributes
from face images automatically [12], [13]. However, users of
such biometric systems may prefer not to be profiled based
on their demographic attributes and may wish to opt-out of
such services due to privacy concerns. In this regard, certain
privacy laws allow users to choose what information about
themselves to reveal and what information to conceal [14],
[15], [16]. Moreover, in the near future, hosts of biometric
application are expected to implement best-practices with
regard to respecting the privacy of users by preventing
automatic information extraction from face images in the
absence of the users’ consent [17], [18]. However, even
if information is not extracted intentionally, user images
stored in a database are still susceptible to privacy breaches
from third party users or applications. Thus, to provide
actionable means and guarantees for preventing the auto-
matic mining of personal information from face images,
recent research has explored the possibility of imparting soft
biometric privacy to face images by modifying the image
data directly [19], [20], [21], [22].
To provide a practical approach for imparting gender
privacy to face images, Mirjalili et al. previously devel-
oped the Semi-Adversarial Network (SAN) model [23]. This
SAN model is able to conceal gender information in face
images while retaining satisfactory face matching accuracy.
In later studies, improvements of the SAN model resulted
in state-of-the-art matching performance with arbitrary face
matchers under the constraint that arbitrary gender classi-
fiers were not able to extract gender information from the
modified face images [24], [25].
While the previously developed SAN model is only
capable of hiding gender information, in this paper, we pro-
pose a new model, named PrivacyNet, for imparting multi-
attribute privacy to face images including age, gender, and
race. The overall objective of this work is to develop a model
that can induce selective (which attributes to conceal) and
collective (how many attributes to conceal) perturbations to
impart soft biometric privacy to face imagess (Fig. 1) while
retaining biometric matching performance.
2 RELATED WORK
With recent advances in machine learning and deep learn-
ing for computer vision, the prediction of soft biometric
attributes such as age, gender, and ethnicity from facial
biometric data has been widely studied [9], [26], [27], [28],
[29]. For instance, the use of convolutional neural networks
for predicting the gender from face images has resulted in
models with almost perfect prediction accuracy [28], [30],
[31], [32], [33]. Methods for estimating the apparent age from
face images are similarly well studied, and current-state of
ar
X
iv
:2
00
1.
00
56
1v
2 
 [c
s.C
V]
  1
4 F
eb
 20
20
2Gender
Age
Race
PrivacyNet
M:
G:
A:
R:
M:
G:
A:
R:
M:
G:
A:
R:
M:
G:
A:
R:
M:
G:
A:
R:
M:
G:
A:
R:
M:
G:
A:
R:
M:
G:
A:
R:
Original image
Gender
Age
Race
M:
G:
A:
R:
M:
G:
A:
R:
M:
G:
A:
R:
M:
G:
A:
R:
M:
G:
A:
R:
M:
G:
A:
R:
M:
G:
A:
R:
M:
G:
A:
R:
Original image
PrivacyNet: 
Transforming face images for 
obfuscating soft-biometric 
attributes
Fig. 1: Illustration of the overall objective of this work:
transforming an input face image across three orthogonal
axes for imparting multi-attribute privacy selectively while
retaining recognition utility. The abbreviated letters are M:
Matching, G: Gender, A: Age, and R: Race.
the art methods can predict the apparent age of a person
with a prediction error below three years on average [26],
[27], [34], [35].
While tremendous progress has been made towards the
automatic extraction of personal attributes of face images,
the development of methods and techniques for imparting
soft biometric privacy is still a relatively recent area of
research. In 2014, Othman and Ross introduced the concept
of soft biometric privacy, where a face image is modified
such that the gender information is confounded while the
recognition utility of the face image is preserved [19]. The
researchers proposed a face mixing approach, where a face
image is morphed with a candidate face image from the
opposite gender. As a result, the resulting mixed face im-
age contains both male and females features such that the
gender information was fully anonymized. Sim and Zhang
then developed methods for imparting soft biometric pri-
vacy to multiple attributes based on multi-modal discrimi-
nant analysis, in which certain attributes can be selectively
suppressed while retaining others [20]. They proposed a
technique that decomposes a face image representation into
orthogonal axes corresponding to gender, age, and ethnicity,
and the identity information is left as a residual of this de-
composition. This enables transforming a face image along
one axis resulting in modifying the corresponding attribute,
while other information of the face image remains visibly
unchanged to the human eye. They also showed that their
proposed method can alter identities of face images, which
is useful for face de-identification [36], [37]. However, Sim
and Zhang’s [20] method cannot explicitly preserve the
matching performance of transformed face images, there-
fore, the biometric utility of the resulting face images is
severely diminished.
In 2013, Szegedy et al. [38] studied the vulnerability of
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) towards adversarial pertur-
bations. Adversarial perturbations are small perturbations
added to an input image, typically imperceptible by a hu-
man observer, that can cause the DNN to misclassify images
with high confidence. In recent years, several methods for
generating such adversarial perturbations have been pro-
posed, and the development towards methods that make
DNN-based models more robust against these so-called ad-
versarial attacks remains an active area of research [39], [40],
[41], [42], [43], [44], [45]. The vulnerability to adversarial
attacks raises several security concerns for the use of ma-
chine learning systems in computer vision applications [18],
[39], [46], [47]. Recently, Rozsa et al. [48] investigated the
robustness of machine learning applications for predicting
the soft-biometric attributes from face images against adver-
sarial attacks. Based on the concept of adding adversarial
perturbations to an input image, Mirjalili and Ross [11]
investigated the possibility of generating adversarial pertur-
bations for imparting soft-biometric privacy to face images.
This scheme was further extended by Chhabera et al. [21]
to conceal multiple face attributes simultaneously. While
these perturbation-based methods are shown to successfully
derive adversarial examples based on a specific attribute
classifier, the perturbed output images are not generalizable
across unseen attribute classifiers. For a real-world privacy
application, generalizability of adversarial examples to un-
seen attribute classifiers is critical [25].
Recently, methods have been developed that impart
privacy through the design and use of specific face repre-
sentation vectors, which have been derived from the original
face images without including the sensitive information that
is to be concealed [49], [50], [51], [52]. For instance, the
SensitiveNet [51] model generates agnostic face represen-
tations for biometric recognition such that gender and race
information are removed from these representations [53].
However, storing face representation vectors may not be de-
sirable in many applications since these vectors are neither
interpretable by humans nor compatible with future face
recognition software. In this work, we develop a generally
applicable method that applies perturbations to the face
images directly instead of deriving representations.
In previous work [23], Mirjalili et al. developed a deep
learning-based model to generate perturbed examples for
obfuscating gender information in face images. The neural
network was coined Semi-Adversarial Network (SAN) and
is composed of a convolutional autoencoder for synthe-
sizing face images such that the gender information in
the synthesized images is obfuscated while their matching
utility is preserved. The SAN model is trained using an
auxiliary gender classifier and an auxiliary face matcher.
After training, the auxiliary subnetworks are discarded and
the convolutional autoencoder is used for performance eval-
uation on unseen data. It was shown that this model is able
to suppress gender information as assessed by some unseen1
attribute classifiers while the matching utility, assessed by
unseen face matchers, was retained. Moreover, the general-
izability of SAN models to fool arbitrary gender classifiers
can be further enhanced by diversifying the auxiliary classi-
fiers during training [25] or by combining multiple, diverse
SAN models [24].
Apart from imparting soft biometric privacy via SAN,
Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) [54], [55], [56]
and its variants have shown remarkable performance in
many computer vision tasks such as image-to-image transla-
1. In contrary to “auxiliary” classifiers, the term “unseen” indicates
that the attribute classifier (or face matcher) was not used during the
training stage.
3tion [57] and face image synthesis [58], [59], [60], [61]. How-
ever, GAN models are not considered as a viable solution for
imparting soft biometric privacy since the objective of GAN-
based models for image-to-image translation is to synthesize
realistic face images while the biometric matching utility is
not explicitly preserved.
While previous work [24] has shown its efficacy in im-
parting gender privacy to face images, existing methods for
imparting multi-attribute privacy are limited. As mentioned
earlier, the work of Chhabra et al. [21] is not generaliz-
able to previously unseen attribute classifiers. Furthermore,
the controllable face privacy model proposed by Sim and
Zhang [20] cannot retain the recognition utility of the face
images.
The main contribution of this work is the design of a
multi-attribute face privacy model to provide controllable
soft-biometric privacy. This proposed GAN-based privacy
model, which we refer to as “PrivacyNet,” modifies an input
face image to obfuscate soft-biometric attributes while
maintaining the recognition capability on the generated
face images. To the best of our knowledge, the “PrivacyNet”
model proposed in this paper is the first method for multi-
attribute privacy that generalizes to unseen attribute classi-
fiers while preserving the recognition utility of face images.
3 PROPOSED METHOD
3.1 Problem Formulation
Given a face image X , let Sobf be a set of face attributes to be
obfuscated and Skeep be a set of attributes to be preserved.
The overall objective is to perturb the input image X such
that the perturbed image X ′ = φ(X) has the following
properties:
• For a soft biometric attribute a ∈ Sobf, the perfor-
mance of an unseen attribute classifier fa is substan-
tially reduced.
• For the remaining set of attributes b ∈ Skeep, the
performance of an arbitrary classifier fb is not no-
ticeably adversely affected; that is, the performance
of an attribute classifier fb on perturbed image X ′ is
close to its performance on the original face image
X .
• The primary biometric utility, which is face recogni-
tion, must be retained for the modified face image,
X ′. In other words, given pairs of image examples
before (〈X1, X2〉) and after (〈X ′1, X ′2〉) perturbations,
the matching performance as assessed by an arbi-
trary face matcher (fM ) is not substantially affected,
i.e.,
fM (X1, X2) ≈ fM (X ′1, X ′2) ≈ fM (X1, X ′2) ≈
fM (X
′
1, X2).
3.2 PrivacyNet
According to the objectives described in Section 3.1, the
PrivacyNet neural network architecture (Fig. 2A) is com-
posed of four sub-networks: A generator (G) that modifies
the input image, a source discriminator (Dsrc) which deter-
mines if an image is real or modified, an attribute classifier
(Dattr) for predicting facial attributes, and an auxiliary face
matcher (M ) for biometric face recognition. Together, these
subnetworks form a cycle-consistent GAN [59] as illustrated
in Fig. 2B. Given an RGB input face image X , the attribute
label vector V0 ∈ Zc corresponds to the ground truth
attribute labels of the original face image. The target label
vector Vt ∈ Zc (c is the total number of attributes) denotes
the desired facial attributes for modifying the face image.
Given a target vector Vt 6= V0, the objective of the generator
G is to synthesize a new image X ′ = G(X,Vt) such that
X ′ is mapped to the target label vector Vt by an attribute
classifier Dattr . The other component of the GAN model is
a source discriminator Dsrc, which is trained to distinguish
real images from those synthesized by the generator.
The total loss terms for training the discriminator
(LD,tot) and the generator (LG,tot) are as follows:
LD,tot = LD,src + λD,attrLD,attr, (1)
and
LG,tot = LG,src + λG,attrLG,attr+
λmLG,m + λrecLG,rec, (2)
where λ terms are hyperparameters representing the rela-
tive weights for the corresponding loss terms. The individ-
ual loss terms of the total loss terms, LD,tot and LG,tot, are
described in the following paragraphs.
The loss terms for discriminating between real and syn-
thesized are defined as
LD,src = EX [− log(Dsrc(X))] +
EX,Vt [− log (1−Dsrc(G(X,Vt)))] (3)
for the discriminator subnetwork and
LG,src = EX,Vt [log(1−Dsrc(G(X,Vt)))] (4)
for the generator subnetwork, respectively. According to
these loss terms, the discriminator learns to distinguish
synthesized images from real images. On the other hand, the
generator learns to generate images that would increase the
prediction error of the discriminator (by generating realistic
faces images).
Similar to the previous loss terms for distinguishing
between real and synthesized face images, the attribute
classification terms are defined as
LD,attr = EX,V0 [− logDattr(V0|X))] (5)
and
LG,attr = EX,Vt [− logDattr(Vt|G(X,Vt))] . (6)
According to these loss terms, the generator will learn to
produce face images that maximize the error of the attribute
classifier while the attribute classifier is optimized to predict
the original face attributes V0 corresponding to the input
face image X .
The loss for optimizing the performance of the biometric
face matcher RM on the perturbed images is defined as the
squared L2 distance between the original face image X and
the synthesized version according to the modified attribute
vector X ′ = G(X,Vt) :
LG,m = EX,Vt
[‖RM(X)−RM(G(X,Vt))‖22] . (7)
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Fig. 2: Schematic representation of the architecture of PrivacyNet for deriving perturbations to obfuscate three attribute
classifiers, gender, age, and race, while allowing biometric face matchers to perform well. (A) Different components of the
PrivacyNet: generator, source discriminator, attribute classifier, and auxiliary face matcher. (B) Cycle-consistency constraint
applied to the generator by transforming an input face image to a target label and reconstructing the original version.
Lastly, a reconstruction loss term is used to form a cycle-
consistent GAN that is able to reconstruct the original face
image X from its modified face image X ′ = G(X,Vt):
LG,rec = EX,V0,Vt [‖X −G(G(X,Vt),V0)‖1] . (8)
Note that the distance term in Eq. 8 is computed as
the pixel-wise L1 norm between the original and modified
image, which empirically results in less blurry images com-
pared to employing a L2 norm as the distance measure [57].
3.3 Neural Network Architecture of PrivacyNet
The composition of the different neural networks used in
PrivacyNet, generator G, real vs. fake classifier Dsrc, at-
tribute classifier Dattr, and face matcher RM is described
in Fig. 3. The generator and the discriminator architectures
were adapted from [58] and [59], respectively.
Generator. The generator G receives as input an RGB
face image X of size 224 × 224 × 3 along with the target
labels Vt concatenated as extra channels. The first two
convolutional layers, with stride 2, reduce the size of the
input image to a to 32 × 32 with 128 channels. The con-
volutional layers are followed by instance normalization
layers (InstanceNorm) [62]. The layer activations are com-
puted by applying the non-linear ReLU activation function
to the InstanceNorm outputs. Then, 6 residual blocks [63]
are applied, followed by two transposed convolution for
upsampling the image size to 224× 224. Finally, the output
image X ′ is constructed by a 1 × 1 convolution layer and
the hyperbolic tangent (Tanh) activation function, which
returns pixels in the range (−1, 1) (the input image pixels
are also scaled to be in range [−1, 1]).
Discriminator and Attribute Classifier. The discrimina-
tor, as shown in Fig. 3, combines the source discriminator
Dsrc and the attribute classifier Dattr into one network
where all the layers except the last convolution layer are
shared among the two tasks. All the shared convolution
layers are followed by a Leaky ReLU non-linear activation
with a small negative slope of α = 0.01. In the last layer,
separate convolutional layers are used for the two tasks,
where Dsrc returns a scalar score for computing the loss
according to Wasserstein GAN [64], and the Dattr returns a
vector of probabilities for each attribute class.
Face Matcher. Lastly, the auxiliary face matcher is
adapted from the publicly available pre-trained VGG-Face
CNN model that receives input face images of size 224 ×
224×3 and computes their face descriptors of size 2622 [65].
3.4 Datasets
We have used five datasets in this study: CelebA [66],
MORPH [67], MUCT [68], RaFD [69], and UTK-face [70]. Ta-
ble 1 shows the number of examples in each dataset, includ-
ing the number of examples for each face attribute. Since the
race label distribution in CelebA is heavily skewed towards
Caucasians, whereas MORPH is heavily skewed towards
persons with African ancestry, we combined CelebA and
MORPH for training. Both the CelebA and MORPH datasets
are split into training and evaluation sets in a subject-
disjoint manner. The two training subsets from CelebA
and MORPH are merged to train the PrivacyNet model
with a relatively balanced race distribution. The other three
datasets, MUCT, RaFD, and UTK-face are used only for
evaluation. While all five datasets provide provide binary
attribute gender labels 2, each dataset lacks the ground-truth
labels for at least one of the other attributes, age or race.
Gender Attribute: All the five datasets considered in this
study provide ground-truth labels for the gender attribute.
Furthermore, since gender is a well-studied topic, there are
several face-based gender predictors available for evalua-
tion. In this study, we have considered three gender classi-
fiers for evaluation: a commercial-off-the-shelf software G-
COTS, IntraFace [71], and AFFACT [28].
2. In this paper we treat gender as a binary attribute with
two labels, male and female; however, it must be noted that so-
cietal and personal interpretation of gender can result in many
more classes. Facebook, for example, suggests over 58 gen-
der classes: https://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2014/02/heres-
a-list-of-58-gender-options-for-facebook-users/.
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Fig. 3: The detailed neural network architectures of three sub-networks of PrivacyNet: the generator G, the discriminators
Dsrc and Dattr, and the pre-trained auxiliary face matcher RM. Note that Dsrc Dattr share the same convolutional layers
and only differ in their respective output layers.
TABLE 1: Overview of datasets used in this study, with the number of face images corresponding to each attribute.
Dataset Gender Race Age groupsMale Female African-descent Caucasian Young Midle-aged Old
CelebA 84,434 118,165 11,119 191,480 1,020 1,181 595
MORPH 47,057 8,551 42,897 12,711 3,733 3,468 861
MUCT 1,844 1,910 1,030 2,724 973 870 665
RaFD 1,008 600 0 1,608 1,250 356 2
UTK-face 12,582 11,522 4,558 19,546 5,384 4,856 3,945
6Race Labels: We consider binary labels for race: Cau-
casians and African descent. Samples that do not belong
to these two race groups are omitted from our study since
the other race groups are under-represented in our training
datasets. We have used the ground-truth labels provided in
the MORPH and UTK-face datasets, but for the other three
datasets, we have labeled the samples in multiple stages.
First, an initial estimate of the race attribute is computed
using commercial software R-COTS. Next, the predictions
made by R-COTS from all samples of the same subject are
aggregated, and subjects that show discrepant predictions
for different samples are visualized and the discrepant labels
are manually corrected. Finally, one random sample from
every subject is visually inspected to verify the predicted
label. Furthermore, note that since RaFD did not have any
sample from the African descent race group, we removed
this dataset from race prediction analysis.
Age Information: The ground-truth age information
is only provided in the MORPH and UTK-face datasets.
Therefore, for the remaining datasets (CelebA, MUCT, and
RaFD) we used the commercial-off-the-shelf A-COTS soft-
ware to obtain the class labels of the original images. For
the evaluation of our proposed model, we use the Mean
Absolute Error (MAE) metric to measure the change in age
prediction of the output images of PrivacyNet concerning
the age predictions for the original face images. Therefore,
the combination of all five datasets shows both changes
in age prediction with respect to the original (for CelebA,
MUCT, and RaFD) as well as the ground-truth age values
(for MORPH and UTK-face datasets). For training the Pri-
vacyNet model, we create three age groups based on the age
values
yage =

0 age ≤ 30
1 30 < age ≤ 45
2 45 < age
(9)
We understand that creating age groups will not pre-
serve the relative textural changes of face aging that occurs
due to the non-stationary nature of patterns in face aging
process [26], [35]. However, this scheme is consistent with
the treatment of the other two attributes, gender, and age.
Also, it should be emphasized that our objective is not to
synthesize face images in particular ages (which is known
as age synthesis); instead, the goal of the proposed method
is to disturb the performance of arbitrary age predictors.
Identity Information: For matching analysis, we exclude
the UTK-face dataset since the subject information is not
provided. We have used three face matchers, a commercial-
off-the-shelf software M-COTS, and two publicly available
face matchers DR-GAN [72] and SE-ResNet-50 [73] (SE-Net
for short) which were trained on VGGFace2 dataset [74].
A summary of the datasets and the number of subjects
and samples is provided in Table 2.
4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The proposed PrivacyNet model is trained on the joint
training subsets of CelebA and MORPH as explained in
Section 3.4. Due to the memory-intensive training process,
we used a batch-size of 16. The models were trained for
200, 000 iterations. The optimal hyperparameter settings
TABLE 2: Summary of the datasets used in this study, with
their number of subjects and samples in the train-test splits;
The excluded experiments indicate the dataset is removed
from the experiment for the reasons given in the text.
Datasets Train Test Excluded# Subj # Samples # Subj # Samples Experiments
CelebA 8,604 150,530 167 2,795 –
MORPH 11,176 45,512 1,968 8,038 –
MUCT – – 185 2,508 –
RaFD – – 67 1,608 Race
UTK-face – – NA 14,182 Matching
for the weighting coefficients of the attribute loss terms
were λattr,d = 1 and λattr,d = 4. The matching term
coefficient was set to λm = 4, and the hyperparameter
for the reconstruction term was set to λrec = 4. After
training the PrivacyNet model, both the discriminator and
the auxiliary face matcher subnetworks are discarded and
only the generator is used for transforming the unseen face
images in the evaluation datasets.
Additionally, we also trained a cycle-GAN model [58]
without the auxiliary face matcher as a baseline to study
the effects of the face matcher. The cycle-GAN model is
trained using the same protocol that was described for train
PrivacyNet. In the remainder of this paper, we will refer to
this method as “baseline-GAN”. The transformations of five
different example images from the CelebA-test dataset are
shown in Fig. 4.
The following subsections summarize the results of from
the experiments and analyze how the performances of the
attribute classifiers and face matchers are affected by the
face attribute perturbations via PrivacyNet.
4.1 Perturbing Facial Attributes
The performance assessment of the proposed PrivacyNet
model involves three objectives:
1) when an attribute is selected to be perturbed, the
performance of unseen attribute classifiers must be
decreased;
2) the attribute classifiers should retain their perfor-
mance on attributes that are not selected for pertur-
bation;
3) in all cases, the performance of unseen face match-
ers must be retained;
We conducted several experiments to assess whether the
proposed PrivacyNet model meets these objectives.
Gender Classification Performance. We have consid-
ered three gender classifiers: a commercial-off-the-shelf soft-
ware (G-COTS), AFFACT [28] and IntraFace [71]. For this
comparison study, all five evaluation datasets that are listed
in Table 2 were considered. The performances of the dif-
ferent gender classifiers on the original and perturbed im-
ages are measured using the Equal Error Rate (EER); the
results are shown in Fig. 5. For a given image, PrivacyNet
can produce up to 15 distinct outputs, depending on the
combination of attributes that are selected for perturbation.
The EER results shown in Fig. 5 indicate that PrivacyNet
increases the error rate of the cases where the gender at-
tribute is willfully perturbed, which is desired. At the same
time, it can preserve the performance of gender classifiers
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8Fig. 5: Performance of three gender classifiers G-COTS, AFFACT, and IntraFace on original images as well as different
outputs of the proposed model (the larger the difference the better). The results of a face mixing approach , as described
in [19] are also shown. Different outputs are marked by their selected attributes: G: gender, R: race, and A: age where the
specific target age group abbreviated as A0 (young), A1 (middle-aged), and A2 (old). The outputs of PrivacyNet where the
gender attribute is selected for perturbation are shown in orange, and the rest are shown in blue.
when gender information is to be retained. The EER of
gender classification using G-COTS software on gender-
perturbed outputs has increased to 20-40%, and the EER
of gender classification using AFFACT and IntraFace on
those outputs has surpassed 60%. Comparisons between the
gender prediction results on the outputs of PrivacyNet and
the outputs of the face-mixing approach by Othman and
Ross [19], as well as the model by Sim and Zhang [20], show
that in case of G-COTS, PrivacyNet results are superior to
the reference works in terms of increasing the EER (Fig. 5).
Note that we did not include the results of the GAN
model in Fig. 5 to improve readability. However, we ob-
served that the GAN model has shown larger deviations
(which is advantageous) in cases where gender was in-
tended to be perturbed. This is expected since the GAN
model does not have the constraints from the auxiliary face
matcher. Therefore, there is more flexibility for modifying
the patterns of the face. However, a disadvantage of the
GAN model is that it also significantly degrades the match-
ing utility as shown in Section 4.2.
Race Prediction Performance. We conducted the race
prediction analysis using commercial-off-the-shelf software,
R-COTS. Similar to the gender classification experiments,
we have shown the EER of race classification on original
images as well as different outputs of PrivacyNet model in
Fig. 6. Since the face mixing approach proposed in [19] was
only formulated for gender and not race perturbations, we
did not include it in this section.
The EER results in Fig. 6 show that PrivacyNet success-
fully meets the objectives of our study for confounding race
predictors. The outputs where race is not intended to be
perturbed (shown in blue) show low EER values similar to
the EER obtained from the original images (EER ∼ 1%). On
the other hand, when race is selected to be perturbed, the
EER values increase significantly (EER ∼ 20% for CelebA
and UTK-face, and EER ∼ 10% for MORPH and MUCT
datasets). The results of separately perturbing gender and
race using the controllable face privacy method proposed
9Fig. 6: Performance of the race classifier R-COTS on original images as well as different outputs of the proposed model.
Different outputs are marked by their selected attributes: G: gender, R: race, and A: age where the specific target age group
is shown with A0, A1, and A2 (the larger the difference the better). The outputs of PrivacyNet where the race attribute is
selected for perturbation are shown in orange, and the rest are shown in blue.
in [20] are also shown for comparison. When the race
attribute is perturbed according to [20], the performance is
slightly higher than our model. However, the disadvantage
of the controllable face privacy method [20] is that when
it perturbs the gender attribute, it also affects the race
predictions.
Age Prediction Performance. To assess the ability of
PrivacyNet for confounding age information, we used a
commercial-off-the-shelf age predictor (A-COTS), which has
shown remarkable performance across the different datasets
tested in this study (Fig. 7). We used the Mean Absolute
Error values in unit of years to measure the change in age
prediction before and after perturbing the images (Fig. 7).
As mentioned previously (Section 3.4), the ground-truth
age values for three datasets, CelebA, MUCT, and RaFD
are not provided. Therefore, for these three datasets, the
MAE values are computed as the difference between the
age predictions on the output images and the predictions
on the original images, while for the other two datasets,
MORPH and UTK-face, the ground-truth values are used
for computing the MAE values.
The results of age-prediction show that when the MAE
obtained from the outputs where age is not meant to be per-
turbed remains at approximately 5 years. However, when
we intend to modify the age of face images, using label A2
results in the highest MAE (around 20 years for RaFD and
15 years for the other four datasets) compared to A0 and A1.
A possible explanation for this observation is that, due the
nature of the aging process, larger textural changes occur in
face images belonging to A2. The MAE of the A0 group is
also relatively large (except for RaFD), which may be caused
by the reversal of the textural changes. However, the results
of the middle age group (A1) is similar to the cases where we
did not intend to modify the age. We hypothesize that the
small changes in A0 are also due to the non-stationary aging
patterns; the age perturbations via the PrivacyNet model
can potentially be improved by using an ordinal regression
approach for age prediction.
4.2 Retaining the Matching Utility of Face Images
Besides obfuscating soft-biometric attributes in face images,
another objective of this work is to retain the recognition
utility of all outputs of PrivacyNet. For this purpose, we
have conducted matching experiments using three unseen
face matchers: commercial-off-the-shelf software (M-COTS)
and two publicly available matchers, SE-ResNet-50 trained
on the VGGFace2 dataset [74] (SE-Net for short), and DR-
GAN [72]. Fig. 8 shows the ROC curves obtained from these
matching experiments for four datasets, CelebA, MORPH,
MUCT, and RaFD. The UTK-face dataset is removed from
this analysis since it does not contain subject information.
Since PrivacyNet generated 15 outputs for each input face
image, the minimum and maximum True Match Rate (TMR)
values at each False Match Rate (FMR) are computed and
only the range of values for these 15 outputs are shown.
Note that it is expected that the matching utility is retained
in all these 15 outputs. Similarly, the range of TMR values
at each FMR obtained from the 15 different outputs of the
GAN model that did not have auxiliary face matcher for
training is also shown for comparison. The ROC curves of
PrivacyNet are very close to the ones obtained from the
original images for each dataset, compared to the baseline
results, which both show significantly larger deviations.
In addition to the ROC curves, we have also plotted the
Cumulative Match Characteristics (CMC) [75], as shown in
Fig. 9. According to the CMC curves, the results of Priva-
cyNet match very closely with the CMC curves obtained
from the original images in all cases, which shows that
PrivacyNet retains the matching utility.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we designed PrivacyNet, which is a deep
neural network model for imparting multi-attribute pri-
10
Fig. 7: Change in age predictions made by A-COTS on different outputs of the proposed model with respect to the age
prediction on original images for CelebA, MUCT and RaFD and the ground-truth age values for MORPH and UTK-face
datasets. Different outputs are marked by their selected attributes: G: gender, R: race, and A: age where the specific target
age group is shown with A0, A1 and A2. The outputs of PrivacyNet where the age attribute is selected for perturbation are
shown in orange, and the rest are shown in blue.
vacy to face images including age, gender, and race at-
tributes. PrivacyNet utilizes a Semi-Adversarial Network
(SAN) module combined with Generative Adversarial Net-
works (GAN) to perturb an input face image, where certain
attributes are obfuscated selectively, while other face at-
tributes are preserved. Most importantly, the matching util-
ity of face images from these transformations is preserved.
Experimental results using three unseen face matchers as
well as three unseen attribute classifiers show the efficacy of
our proposed model in perturbing such attributes, while the
matching utility of face images is not adversely impacted.
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